30 June 2008

Documents sent to the Attorney General Part 1

Below are the documents sent to the Attorney General in support of my case, as referred to in my earlier post.

Witness Statement of Meirion Francis LEWIS
Dated 3 November 1992

Further to the statement given on 11th August 1992 in which I assessed documentation identified as AW/6, I have today been shown document JS/20, the original of AW/6, a further quantity of documents contained in JS/15, and six SAW devices in JS/14. I make the following observations on these documents and devices. Most of the documents and all the devices relate to surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices. These operate by converting an electrical signal to the form of an acoustic wave on the surface of a crystal like quartz, and then reconverting it to electrical form. The surface acoustic waves are similar to waves on the sea. During the device operation the electrical signal is modified, for example delayed, or filtered so as to pass only frequencies of interest. These devices are of considerable commercial importance, for example there is one in every TV set and video recorder. They are also of military importance because they work at appropriate frequencies, provide a high-fidelity response, and are small, rugged and reliable. The six examples I have examined from JS/14 are all narrowband filters and quite possibly have a military purpose. None is related to gas-sensing. The notes in JS/15 comprise a set of intimate details on the processing of SAW devices, and their mounting and packaging, and test procedures. They also indicate the personnel involved. The details included relate to the substrates, their orientations, polishing, backface preparation, packaging, electron beam evaporation procedures for the metallization, bond formation, the mask alignment jig operation, tuning circuits, and mounting adhesives. One document (Demonstrator Programme Requirement Specification Bandpass Filter Assembly) relates to a filter developed as a demonstrator for the receiver in an airborne guided weapon. Another relates to an ESA project, and is concerned with space qualification of the SAW devices. One document (ABSTRACT FOR INCLUSION IN PD9002) relates to a spinel delay line providing 30 microseconds delay at 3 GHz. This is not a SAW device, but a bulk acoustic wave device used in RAPIER. This information is valuable to a foreign power as it provides intimate details of the manufacturing processes of SAW devices, and the means of testing same. The applications of these devices are diverse, but some are definitely military applications as is clear from these notes.

Signed: M. F. Lewis
Signature witnessed by: S. Stafford DS

Meirion Francis Lewis Witness Statement 3 November 1992 p.1

Meirion Francis Lewis Witness Statement 3 November 1992 p.2

Criminal Cases Review Commission

Statement of: Meirion Francis Lewis

In October 1993, I gave evidence for the prosecution at the trial of Michael Smith at the Old Bailey in London.

I have been shown by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) a copy of two witness statements which I made to the police (dated 11 August 1992 and 3 November 1992), together with a copy of a transcript of my trial evidence.

I have been asked by the CCRC to explain the circumstances in which I came to give evidence about the ALARM missile system.

When giving evidence I was asked to comment upon the sensitivity of various documents alleged to have been found in Mr Smith’s possession, and to comment upon whether these documents, together with the information contained in them, might have been useful to an enemy of the UK.

One of the documents I was asked to comment upon (which is referred to as document number 51-59 in the transcript of my evidence) was a document sent by Marconi Space and Defence Systems (MSDS) to the Hirst Research Centre of GEC headed ‘Demonstrator Programme Requirement Specification Bandpass Filter Assembly’. I gave evidence in chief that this document related to a programme to build surface acoustic wave filters for use in a receiver in an airborne guided weapon system (see page 13D-H and 17E-H of the trial transcript). I said that I did not know exactly what the missile system was (see page 19C and 25D-E of the trial transcript).

During the course of my evidence I referred to, and was cross-examined by defence counsel, on several documents, including document number 51-59 described above, and a document on sensors. My description of the sensitivity of this latter document was challenged by defence counsel by reference to the abstract of a published scientific paper. As neither of us had read this published paper in full the Judge asked us both to acquire and read the full paper and return to Court at a later date. I returned to the Old Bailey the following Monday to continue giving evidence.

Over the course of the next day, Friday, and the weekend, I acquired and read the published document on sensors, as requested by the Judge, and reread the sensitive document on sensors to prepare my evidence to the Court. I also took the opportunity to reread the other sensitive documents, including document number 51-59, especially as I felt that defence counsel policy was to challenge my expertise. Upon rereading document number 51-59 I noticed a number of pointers that eventually led me to conclude that the filters in question might be for use in the ALARM missile system. I was aware at that time of the development of the ALARM missile through contact I had had with personnel at MSDS.

I decided to telephone MSDS to see if I could speak to the Technical Director, Dr Reg Humphryes, in order to discuss this matter with him. However, it being a weekend, he was not available. I had planned to travel back to London on the Sunday evening in order to resume my evidence on the Monday morning, and therefore decided to drop a letter into Dr Humphryes at MSDS in Stanmore on my way. In my letter I identified the document in question and asked him some questions, one of which was whether this document related to the ALARM missile system. I left the sealed letter with the security guard at MSDS for Dr Humphryes’ attention. I proposed to telephone him from the Old Bailey the following morning for answers to my questions.

When I arrived at court on the Monday morning I advised Mr Nutting (prosecution counsel) that I thought that I could now identify the missile system in document numbered 51-59. I explained what I had done and that I had arranged to telephone Dr Humphryes that morning. Mr Nutting agreed with this course of action.

I therefore telephoned Dr Humphryes and he confirmed to me that the document related to the ALARM missile system. I accepted what he told me. I informed Mr Nutting of my conversation and he asked me to make a further witness statement giving details of what had occurred, which I did.
I note that at page 59 F of the transcript of my trial evidence there is a reference to my making two further statements which were before the Court. I assume that these statements were disclosed to the defence. I cannot now recall precisely what I said in these statements, although I assume that in one of them I must have explained about my conversation with Dr Humphryes and the information I received from him. The second statement might well have been related to the papers on sensors described above.

I resumed giving evidence and in response to questions from Mr Nutting told the jury that I had discovered that the filters referred to in the document numbered 51-59 were used in the ALARM missile system which was currently in service with our armed forces.

Signed: M.F. Lewis
Witnessed by: Gregor McDonald
Dated: 22 February 2005

Meirion Francis Lewis Witness Statement 22 February 2005 p.1

Meirion Francis Lewis Witness Statement 22 February 2005 p.2

Witness Statement of Meirion Francis LEWIS
Dated 11 October 1993

On 7th October 1993 I gave evidence in the case of R v SMITH at the Central Criminal Court. During my evidence I was referred to a RESTRICTED document entitled “Demonstrator Programme Requirement Bandpass Filter Assembly” which was contained in the Prosecution exhibit bundle at pages 51-59 inclusive. The contents of this document concern sensitive equipment currently in service and should be treated in extreme confidence. I made a number of deductions from this document. These concern the fact that the knowledge of the IF frequency and bandwidth could be useful to a potential enemy who wished to jam the airborne guided weapon concerned. In addition, I noted that the specification on the group delay matching of the IF filters was significant in suggesting the mode of operation of the weapon. From this I deduced that the missile was likely to be an “ARM”, i.e. an ANTI-RADAR-MISSILE. In the intervening period I have therefore contacted the Marconi Company who have confirmed my suspicions. They confirm that the receiver is used in a missile called “ALARM”, which is currently in service with the R.A.F. It may be recalled that during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein switched off his radars, giving us total air superiority. This was undoubtedly because of the threat from the ARMs. It is therefore clear that the document concerned is not of academic interest, but could affect the lives of service personnel. Concerning the technique of jamming, the Russians are of course expert, for example they have been jamming Western radio broadcasts for decades. I also note that the document contains information on the numbers of filters required, which relates to the numbers of missiles to be constructed.

Signed: M. F. Lewis
Signature witnessed by: ?

Meirion Francis Lewis Witness Statement 11 October 1993

Criminal Cases Review Commission
Alpha Tower
Suffolk Street Queensway
Birmingham B1 1TT
Tel: 0121 633 1800

Statement of: Reginald Humphryes

Address: C/O THALES
Aerospace Division, Manor Royal, Crawley, West Sussex, RH10 9PZ
Date statement taken: 20 July 2005

I am employed as a Project Director at THALES, Aerospace Division, at the above address. I have been asked by the Criminal Cases Review Commission whether I have any recollection of an incident that occurred when I was employed by Marconi during October 1993.

I have been shown a statement made by Professor Meirion Francis Lewis, dated 22 February 2005. I have also been shown a document which I am told relates to an Anti Radar Missile (ARM) known as ALARM. I do not have any recollection of the incident to which Professor Lewis refers, which is not to say that it did not occur. The ARM document is outwith my particular field of expertise so I could not say whether or not it related to the ALARM system without consulting colleagues.

It may be of some assistance if I explain the structure of Marconi and the location and nature of my employment at the relevant time. Marconi Space and Defence Systems (MSDS) ceased to exist in that name in the early 1980s, and the company split into (1) Marconi Space (dealing with space communications), (2) Marconi Defence Systems (dealing with electronic warfare systems) and (3) Marconi Dynamics (dealing with guided weapons). In 1985 I joined Marconi Defence Systems.

My area of expertise is in microwaves and electronic warfare. ARM systems were developed in Marconi Dynamics although some microwave components for ALARM were developed and produced in Marconi Defence Systems.

In October 1993 I was Technical Director at Marconi Defence Systems. At that time, Ray Matthews was the Managing Director of Marconi Dynamics, I believe his Technical Director was Mike Jones, and Jim Gailer or Martin Winstone was the resident expert/project manager on ALARM. I do not know the whereabouts of any of these people now, as I left Marconi in 2000, and the company no longer exists having been, I believe, subsumed into Matra BAe Dynamics. I think Messrs Matthew and Jones may have retired.

If a written query relating to ALARM had been left, marked for my attention, at the Security Gate of Marconi Defence Systems, I would have passed it to the team at Marconi Dynamics, but I have no recollection of the matter at all. Furthermore, I do not recall having a telephone conversation with Meirion Lewis on the morning of Monday 11 October 1993 relating to the contents of any such document.

Signed: Reginald Humphryes
Witnessed by: J.Lee

Reginald Humphryes Statement 20 July 2005 p.1

Reginald Humphryes Statement 20 July 2005 p.2

Michael John Smith

1. Smith was employed as a Senior Quality Assurance (QA) engineer and manager at GEC Hirst Research Centre from December 1985 to July 1992. During that time he had access, in the normal course of his duties, to a wide range of research and development tasks; manufacturing, assembly and test processes; and electronic components, devices and equipment.

2. As a competent QA engineer, he would be checking that all manufacturing and assembly processes were carried out correctly in accordance with the various standards, rules and regulations that would apply. Much of this information is not classified, as Dr Cundy said in his statement. He would also get to know, and need to know, the timescales and priorities of the different projects for which he was carrying out his QA tasks. He would certainly be aware which projects he dealt with were for MoD or for other UK defence contractors - the QA requirements for each project differ and it is important to know which “customer” is which. This information is normally classified, for MoD contracts, at RESTRICTED. All the information that Smith saw would, however, be GEC COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE, whether or not that privacy marking was printed on documents.

3. As far as I can see, Smith’s work would give him knowledge on the fine detail of precisely how a given component, device or part was manufactured and assembled. He appears to have been particularly interested in the manufacturing processes (often chemical processes) for integrated circuits (both silicon and gallium arsenide) and for bulk crystalline devices, such as bulk acoustic wave (BAW) delay lines and filters, which are widely used in radar and communications equipment.

4. The material, both documents and devices/hardware, found in Smith’s possession bear this out. The devices are samples of particular items on which GEC Hirst Research Centre were or had been working, and knowledge of how they were manufactured and assembled would be of considerable use to a country or company that found reliable and consistent manufacture of such devices difficult. The documents (notes, drawings, detailed explanation of process steps, etc) are all to do with the details of manufacturing processes for various devices and components; these would be useful to a country or company to enable them to make similar devices reliably and consistently. In reality, Smith was transferring technology and manufacturing know-how to his FSU contact.

5. The Rapier delay line is a case in point. The manufacturing know-how and processes for this and similar devices, widely used in radar and communications equipment, is well-established in the UK and has been so for about 20 years; the same applies to the USA and to some other countries, such as France and Japan. But the FSU may still have considerable difficulty in producing similar devices for use in their own radar and communications equipment which are as small, as rugged, and as reliable; and may not be able to do so consistently and in sufficient quantity to meet their needs. The detailed data given on the manufacture and assembly of the Rapier delay line would therefore be very useful to the FSU in saving them money, time and resources.

6. The GEC Hirst Research Centre is a major UK electronics research and development organisation: it is not a normal manufacturing plant and any production there would be for developmental samples and initial or small batch production. Smith was therefore able to see and gather knowledge of newer, more “leading edge” technology, processes and devices than he would have done if he had been a QA engineer at a normal electronics manufacturing plant. Clearly, this would be more valuable to his FSU contacts than more mundane manufacturing technology.

7. Overall, I assess that the information and knowledge Smith was able to pass on to his FSU contacts was of considerable commercial value to them, in improving their manufacturing technology in these areas and in saving them time and resources to catch up with the West. However, the technology was, in many cases, well-established in the UK and better or improved processes and devices were already available to the UK for defence equipment. I would therefore assess that, in terms of national security, Smith's activities have caused some damage to the UK, but not serious damage.

7 March 1994
J F MacCulloch

DD MoD Sy (S&T)

James Francis MacCulloch MoD damage assessment report 7 March 1994 p.1

James Francis MacCulloch MoD damage assessment report 7 March 1994 p.2


1. I am James Francis MacCulloch

2. I am the author of the security damage assessment dated 7 March 1994.

3. Since I completed that assessment, my attention has been drawn to the evidence given in the criminal trial by Dr M F Lewis, and I have had further discussions with Dr Lewis and Dr D Weatherley. In the light of this further consideration, the assessment dated 7 March 1994 is incomplete. I would therefore amend that statement as follows:-

a) Delete the last sentence of paragraph 7.

b) Add three new paragraphs, to read:-

“8. The details of the information and knowledge in the possession of Smith was of direct military significance, because it would allow the operating characteristics and parameters of certain UK in-service weapon systems to be inferred by Russian radar and missile experts. In particular, this is true of both the Rapier Air Defence Missile System and the ALARM airborne anti-radiation missile (ARM).

9. The specification headed “Demonstrator Programme Requirement Specification Bandpass Filter Assembly” dated 8th January 1992 gives particular concern. If this specification was specifically identified as linked to ALARM, it would allow the identification of certain key operating parameters of that weapon system, which in turn would allow an intelligent enemy to develop effective countermeasures. The fact that Dr Lewis was able from his own knowledge to link this specification to ALARM indicates that the same linkage could be made by a hostile intelligence service.

10. For these reasons, my overall assessment now is that, in terms of national security, Smith’s activities have caused some considerable damage to the UK’s interests, but serious damage in the case of ALARM. Some of this damage is potential, in that countermeasures to these systems could be developed, but we have no way of knowing if the Russians have or not.”

16 May 1995
J F MacCulloch

DD HQ Sy (S&T)

James Francis MacCulloch MoD damage assessment report 16 May 1995

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